‘Recycling’ evidentiality: a research program

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Abstract

In this paper, I challenge the idea that evidentiality constitutes a grammatical category of its own. I propose that it should be viewed as a grammatical mechanism that creates evidential meanings by recombinations of features ‘recycled’ from other, more basic grammatical categories.

1 Evidentiality as a grammatical category

The languages of the world display a wide variety of grammatical markers to express evidentiality, ranging from dedicated morphemes to adverbs and parentheticals. Despite this expressive variety, evidentials form a closed class system of mutually exclusive markers. The range of evidential meanings that is expressed is limited to 3 or 4 in most languages. There is also a striking consistency across languages in the types of evidence expressed by these markers. Many authors have proposed a basic distinction between direct and indirect evidence types (see Table 1) which can be further subdivided into at least hearsay and quotative on the one hand, and inference/ conjecture on the other (Givón 1982, Bybee 1985, Willett 1988: 57):

| Direct evidence                          | Personal experience of the speaker: visual/auditory/other sensory |
| Indirect evidence                        | Reported to the speaker: hearsay/quotative                      |
|                                        | Inference/conjecture by the speaker.                             |

2 I dedicate this article to Liliane Haegeman on the occasion of her retirement, with respect, admiration, and gratitude for her impressive work in linguistics.
These evidence types can be illustrated by Faller’s (2002) data on Cuzco Quechua in (1), a language that features dedicated morphemes for three types of evidential meaning:

(1) a. Para-sha-n-mi
   rain-PROG-3-BPG
   p='It is raining.’
   EV: speaker sees that it is raining

b. Para-sha-n-chá.
   rain-PROG-3-CONJ
   p='It is possibly raining.’
   EV: speaker conjectures that it might be raining.

c. Para-sha-n-si.
   rain-PROG-3-REP
   p='It is raining.’
   EV: speaker was told that it is raining

According to Faller (2002), the morpheme -mi in (1a) indicates that the speaker claims to have direct, visual evidence (BPG = best possible grounds) for the fact that it is raining. By contrast, the morpheme -chá in (1b) expresses the speaker’s conjecture, and -si in (1c) reflects hearsay (reportative) (Faller 2002).

The organization of evidence types in Table 1 suggests that evidentials constitute a cross-linguistically homogeneous grammatical category. The evidence types are not only constant across languages, they are also limited in terms of their semantics. In principle, the number of evidence types could have been much higher. As Speas (2008) notes, it is easy to imagine additional indirect evidence types, such as divine revelation, custom, legal edict, or parental authority. No language has such indirect evidentials: there are just the subcategories of direct and indirect evidence, with indirect evidence dividing further into hearsay/quotation and inference/conjecture. The limited nature of this set of subcategories is then implicitly taken as evidence for the idea that evidentials form a closed class of mutually exclusive functional elements that exhibit a paradigmatic pattern of oppositions, just like other grammatical categories. The data from Cuzco Quechua, where dedicated evidential morphemes function as mutually exclusive elements of a closed class paradigm, seem to confirm such an analysis.
2 ‘Splitters’ and ‘recyclers’

A major discussion regarding evidentiality revolves around the question whether evidentiality should be ‘split off’ as a grammatical category in its own right, or whether it is a grammatical notion that ‘recycles’ existing grammatical categories for its own purpose. "Splitters' argue that the specific range of evidential meanings in paradigmatic opposition militates in favor of a separate grammatical status for evidentiality, on a par with categories such as tense, aspect, modality, or person. Evidence types such as witness, hearsay (reportative), and inference are then viewed as universal, elementary features of human language. Just like other functional categories, evidentiality is assigned a specific functional head in the left periphery of the functional domain of the clause (Cinque 1999, Rooryck 2001a, b). The view that evidentiality is a full-fledged grammatical category in its own right is implicitly or explicitly adopted by linguists of various theoretical persuasions (Hardman 1986, Cinque 1999, de Haan 1999, Lazard 2001, Aikhenvald 2004, Davis et al. 2007, Aikhenvald 2018). It is fair to say that it reflects the dominant perspective.

‘Recyclers’, by contrast, seek to relate evidential meanings to the interaction of more elementary grammatical categories, such as tense, aspect, modality, sentence-type, and person. In many languages, evidential meanings do not involve dedicated morphemes at all. Rather, specific evidence types are parasitic on tense, aspect, modality, sentence-type, and person. In these languages, evidential meanings can be analyzed as the result of ‘recycling’ these more basic categories. In what follows, I will reinterpret analyses of evidentiality that relate it to other categories in terms of ‘recycling’. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the authors of these analyses see themselves as ‘recyclers’ in the sense that I am proposing here.

2 This article owes an important intellectual debt to Peggy Speas's work on evidentiality in the last 15 years. To a large extent, the present article does not do much more than taking further some of Peggy's positions and radicalizing them.

3 See Speas (2008) for a critical analysis of this position.

4 The idea of ‘recycling’ as a general grammatical mechanism has recently been given a more solid theoretical footing by Biberauer (2017) as an instance of her Maximize Minimal Means (MMM) principle.
3 Two sources for reportatives

Let me illustrate this with the example of reportative eventuality. It is well known that the German modal sollen ‘should’ does double duty as a reportative evidential (Schenker, 2008, Faller, 2017):

(2) Hubert soll in Berlin sein
Hubert should in Berlin be
i. ‘Hubert should be in Berlin (given his obligations)’ (deontic modal)
ii. ‘Hubert is said to be in Berlin’ (reportative) [German]

Faller (2017) analyses reportative sollen ‘should’ in terms of extending the modal base of deontic sollen ‘should’ to an information modal base. This change in the modal base can be interpreted as an instance of the reportative ‘recycling’ the deontic modal for its own purposes. Other languages recycle different categories to build reportative meaning. Bruil (2014, 2015) shows that in Ecuadorean Siona, reportative eventuality is part of the clause-typing system of the language, alongside declarative and interrogative:

(3) a. Aibi nēcāji.
    Ai-i-bi nēh’ka-hi. (declarative)
    old-NCL:M-SBJ stand-3S.M.PRS.ASS
    ‘The old man is standing.’ (Bruil 2014: ch6, 11a)

b. Aibi nēcaquē?
    Ai-i-bi nēh’ka-ki? (interrogative)
    old-NCL:M-SBJ stand-2/3S.M.PRS.N.ASS
    ‘Is the old man standing?’ (Bruil 2014: ch6, 11b)

c. Jao ti co’meco beocoña.
    Hā-ō ti ko’mē-ko beo-ko-jā. (reportative)
    dem.dst-ncl:f ana row-NOM.S.F neg.exist-2/3S.F.PRS.N.ASS-REP
    ‘She doesn’t have gas.’ (I am told). (Bruil 2014: ch6, 19) [Ecuadorean Siona]

Bruil (2014) analyses this integration of the reportative in the clause-typing system in the following way. She observes that in the declarative and the interrogative, epistemic authority for the proposition lies respectively with the Speaker and the Addressee. The Ecuadorean Siona reportative fits into this system by combining epistemic authority with a non-speech participant. Epistemic authority for the proposition is attributed to a third party that is neither Speaker nor Ad-
dressee. In this way, the essential meaning of reportative is derived \[\text{Bruil} \ (2014)\]. Importantly, the reportative functions entirely within the paradigmatic oppositions afforded by the grammatical category of sentence-type, rather than as a subcategory of evidentiality in the sense of Table 1.

The interest of the examples from German and Ecuadorean Siona lies in the fact that reportative meaning in either language is built from very different ingredients: in German, the reportative recycles deontic modality, while in Ecuadorean Siona, it is parasitic on the clause-typing system. These examples suggest that it is unlikely that ‘reportative’ is a primitive of the grammar, i.e. a particular paradigmatic exponent of an overarching and independent grammatical category ‘evidentiality’. Rather, it suggests that such evidential meanings arise from recombinations of more abstract ingredients that are made available by more basic grammatical categories.

4 More examples of evidential ‘recycling’: tense and aspect

The reportative is not the only evidential meaning that can be derived from more basic grammatical categories. \[\text{Nikolaeva} \ (1999)\] observes that evidentials in Ostyak (Finno-Ugric, Siberia) interact with present and past tense. She derives the evidential meanings of hearsay and inference in terms of equivalence or overlap between situation types. \[\text{Chung} \ (2005)\] shows that Korean evidentials are homophonous with aspect and mood morphemes, and develops an analysis in which these interact with the location of the (1st person) speaker to derive evidential meanings. \[\text{Lau \& Rooryck} \ (2017)\] argue that abstract properties of event structure, more specifically the event stages in accomplishments and achievements, are recycled in terms of information stages for the purposes of evidentiality. A semantic analysis in terms of stages allows them to bring out the close relation between aspect, indirect evidentiality, and mirativity in languages from Turkish and Bulgarian to Washo (Hokan, USA) and Hare (Athapaskan, Canada). For instance, the Turkish morpheme \(-m\text{iş}\) can express perfect aspect, indirect evidentiality, and mirativity:

\begin{equation}
(4) \quad \text{Kemal gel-\text{m}iş} \quad \text{[Turkish]}
\end{equation}

Kemal come-PERF

‘Kemal came.’

(a) INFERENCES: The Speaker sees Kemal’s coat hanging in the front hall,
but has not yet seen Kemal.
(b) HEARSAY: The Speaker has been told that Kemal has arrived, but has not yet seen Kemal.
(c) SURPRISE: The Speaker hears someone approach, opens the door, and sees Kemal—a totally unexpected visitor.”
(?: 187)

In terms of Lau & Rooryck (2017)’s analysis, this is possible because -miş is underspecified in terms of the nature of the stages involved. Informally put, -miş does not care whether its stages are of the event type (aspect) or of the information type (evidentiality/ mirativity). The morpheme -miş is primarily sensitive to the presence of a final stage holding at utterance time, regardless of its status as an information stage or an event stage. Once again, it looks like the more basic category of aspect is ‘recycled’ – bleached in this case – to express evidential meanings.

Such analyses suggest that evidentiality is not a grammatical category on a par with tense, aspect, modality, or sentence-type, but that it rather is a grammatical mechanism that is able to exploit these more primitive categories for its own purposes. This observation makes it very unlikely that evidentiality should be assigned its own functional category in the left periphery, in the sense of Cinque (1999). For all intents and purposes, it is probably sufficient to syntactically represent Speaker and Addressee in the left periphery (Garrett 2001, Speas & Tenny 2003, Haegeman & Hill 2013), since speech participants play an important role in ‘building’ evidential meanings. Note that Speaker and Addressee in this sense are just special instances of the more abstract features 1P and 2P. Following Rooryck (2001a,b) and Speas (2004b,a) among many others, I would argue that syntactically represented speech participants are part and parcel of the elementary syntactic categories that are ‘recycled’ by evidentiality.

The idea that evidentiality does not occupy a well-defined, single position in the functional domain as other grammatical categories do is corroborated by Blain & Déchaine (2007). On the basis of various dialects of Cree, Blain & Déchaine (2007) argue that evidentials differ from each other as a function of the syntactic domain where they are introduced (their Evidential Domain Hypothesis). While this analysis does not call into question evidentiality as a separate category, it suggests that evidentiality arises at various levels of the functional spine, and need not be assigned its own morphosyntactic representation.

Spec (2008) also questions the evidence for an evidential head. However, she does argue in favor of evidentiality as a distinct functional category on a par with tense (see Speas (2010).
5 Evidentiality as a closed class?

The analysis of evidentiality as a distinct grammatical category is further called into question by the fact that its boundaries are not very well established. More precisely, it does not constitute as much of a closed class with well-defined paradigmatic oppositions as the example of Quechua in (1) and the categorization in Table 1 would suggest. There are many instances of vaguely related and overlapping notions that are hard to reduce to strong paradigmatic oppositions. Even in Table 1, the distinction between inference and conjecture is not an immediately obvious one. Anderson (1986) provides a map of mental space for evidential meanings that includes different types of inferentials, as well as a category of expectation (as in English to be supposed to). In Carib, Hoff (1986) argues that introspective evidentials (knowledge through inference) should be distinguished from extraersive evidentials (culturally available knowledge).

More generally, the distinction between evidentiality and modality is notoriously difficult to establish (see Speas (2008, 2018) for an overview). Note also the overlap between indirect evidentiality and mirativity in Turkish and other languages mentioned above in the discussion of (4). The notion of mirativity does not even occur in Table 1, while it can be linked to indirect evidentiality. Building on earlier work by Adelaar (1977, 2013) on mirativity in Quechua, Mexas (2016) argues that mirativity should be understood as ‘sudden realization’: a punctual transition from the epistemic state of ignorance to that of awareness. That redefinition brings mirativity much closer to the indirect evidentiality expressed by inference. As Lau & Rooryck (2017) argue, inference can be viewed as a non-punctual process towards an epistemic transition, and thus only differs in terms of the stages leading to the transition. However, this difference between mirativity and inference is in fact not a properly evidential distinction, but one that is based on notions of the succession of stages that are originally aspectual in nature. Although further study is needed, it is my contention that all oppositions in the evidential domain can ultimately be reduced to properties that are provided by other, more basic grammatical categories.

Assuming that evidential meanings are indeed based on ‘recycled’ features from more basic grammatical categories, the question arises how languages with designated evidential morphemes, such as Quechua, should be dealt with. This is an important question, since languages in which dedicated evidential
morphemes are obligatorily expressed are often set apart from languages without such evidentials (Aikhenvald 2004, 2018). My proposal here would be that dedicated evidential morphemes are the result of grammaticalizing the properties of more basic grammatical categories into specific markers. de Haan (1999) shows that the diachronic sources of evidentials involve verbs of speech, vision, and inference; spatial expressions, and tense and aspect. However, the 'standalone' nature of a set of dedicated evidential morphemes is not enough to provide them with their own dedicated grammatical label. Rather, they are often morphosyntactically dependent on other categories in the functional domain. It is well known that the exact morphosyntactic position of dedicated evidential morphemes differs widely across languages, a point also made by Blain & Déchaine (2007). This positional variability is another argument against assigning them a specific position and label in the functional domain.

Despite the fuzziness of a number of evidential meanings, the fact remains that evidential morphemes often appear to function as if they were part of a closed class as in Table 1. However, from the perspective of 'recycling', this apparent paradigmatic organisation should be viewed as a consequence of the limited number of categories that are available for evidential 'recycling'. A limited variety of recycled categories can yield the circumscribed set of evidential meanings illustrated in Table 1. What remains surprising is that ingredients that are so different at the outset result in the same evidential outcomes, as in the case of reportatives discussed in section 3 above. A research program into the 'recycling' nature of evidentiality should explore the constraints on the type of categories that can be recycled for evidential purposes. The categories that can be recycled must have a set of abstract features that are compatible with evidential meanings. In the next section, I will examine Speas's (2010) proposal for such an abstract analysis of evidentiality, evaluate to what extent it fits 'recycling' purposes, and formulate a proposal of my own that complements Speas' (2010) approach.

6 Analyzing the basic features behind evidentiality: Speas (2010)

Speas (2010) develops a theoretical approach to evidentiality that aims at deriving specific evidential meanings from more abstract features and mechanisms. She argues against the notion of 'evidence' as a grammatical primitive, and pro-
poses an analysis of direct and indirect evidentiality in terms of the accessibility of situations, much inspired by Kratzer’s (1977) analysis of modals in terms of a modal base of accessible situations, and a Reichenbachian approach to tense. Speas (2010) proposes three types of situation:

(5)  
   a. Evaluated Situation (ES): The situation of which \( p \) is true  
   b. Reference Situation (RS): A situation or set of assumptions relevant to ES and DS  
   c. Discourse Situation (DS): The situation in which the sentence is being uttered

Between these Situations, two types of relations can hold: inclusion or accessibility. Indirect evidentiality involves a context in which the Reference Situation is accessible from the Evaluated Situation, while in direct evidentiality, the Reference Situation includes the Evaluated Situation. Further distinctions within direct and indirect evidentiality are made possible by the notion of Discourse Situation. In Hearsay, RS is not only accessible from ES, but RS is in turn accessible from DS. In other words, an ES in which ‘Kim saw a bear’ is true, is accessible to an RS where Kim tells the speaker that she saw a bear, and this RS is in turn accessible to the Discourse Situation where the speaker tells the hearer ‘Kim saw a bear’, while including into that statement an evidential expressing that this information was made accessible through Kim’s telling the speaker. By contrast, in indirect evidentials (inferences), RS includes DS.

Direct evidentials can likewise be further divided into ‘internal’ situations only the speaker can know (personal experience), and situations external to the speaker that are directly perceived through other senses. This is for instance the case in Eastern Pomo:

(6)  
   a. bi.Yá pha.bé-kh-ink’e  
      hand burn-PUNCTUAL-SENSORY  
      ‘I burned my hand’ (I feel the sensation of burning in my hand)  
   b. mí.-p-al pha.bé-k-a  
      3.sg.-male-PATIENT burn-PUNCTUAL-DIRECT  
      ‘He got burned’ (I have direct evidence, e.g., I saw it happen)[Eastern Pomo]

Speas (2010) analyses personal experience as a context in which RS includes both ES and DS. By contrast, direct evidentiality through other sensory perception is defined as a context in which RS not only includes ES, but is also accessible from
DS. In other words, Speas (2010) reanalyzes the labels for evidential meanings in terms of the relations between the Evaluation Situation and a Reference Situation, and the Reference Situation and the Discourse Situation.

| “Personal experience” | RS includes ES  
|                       | RS includes DS |
| “Direct”              | RS includes ES  
|                       | RS is accessible from DS |
| “Indirect”            | RS is accessible from ES  
|                       | RS includes DS |
| “Hearsay”             | RS is accessible from ES  
|                       | RS is accessible from DS |

(7)

The aim of this analysis is of course very close to the one I am trying to defend here: evidentiality is analyzed in terms of more abstract features and relations that are shared with other categories. As Speas (2010) notes, the notions of Evaluation, Reference, and Discourse situation are very close to the notions Event time, Reference time and Discourse time from tense and aspect. Similarly, the inclusion and accessibility relations are very close to inclusion and precedence in tense and aspect. This closeness allows for a better understanding of the many cases in which tense and aspect morphemes are 'recycled' with evidential meanings.

However, Speas (2010) analysis also has a number of drawbacks. Just like in Reichenbachian approaches to tense and aspect, many more relations between RS, ES, and DS are possible in principle than those described in (7), and it is not clear why these are excluded or unattested. In (7), RS always enters an inclusion or accessibility relation with either DS or ES, but this asymmetry does not seem to derive from anything within the evidential system. It is also not clear whether indirect (inference) and hearsay are characterized with sufficient detail in this system. Speas (2010) states that the inference relation is characterized by an inclusion relation of DS in RS, because when making an inference, a speaker takes into account the current state of affairs. While that may be true, this inclusion does not capture the essence of what an inference is. An inference is a process of deduction on behalf of the speaker, who considers various types of contextual information to draw the conclusion that is likely that something is the case. The description of inference in terms of accessibility and inclusion does not take into
consideration that inferentials are always related to the speaker: the inference must be drawn by the speaker. Nothing in this description precludes an inferential evidential that would express an inference made by a third party, with the speaker simply reporting that this counts as the knowledge source of the statement. In other words, the description of inference in terms of accessibility and inclusion is compatible with the notion of inference, but it does not describe it precisely enough. Similarly, the description for hearsay does not include reference to the fact that the source of the hearsay always must be a third party. In other words, there are no hearsay evidentials dedicated to information provided by the hearer. Again, this does not quite follow from the description in (7).

7 Evidentiality and the proximal–distal distinction

However, I do believe that the analysis in (7) is on the right track, and rather than replace it I would like to propose an alternative perspective on the direct/ indirect evidentiality distinction that constrains Speas’s (2010) approach further. My proposal will perhaps also make it easier to evaluate which criteria basic grammatical categories have to fulfill to be able to be recycled into evidential meanings.

I will first examine the distinction between direct and indirect evidentiality in Table 1. Direct evidentiality signals that the speaker was present at the event, since they experienced the event by seeing, hearing, or even smelling it. Indirect evidentiality, whether by hearsay or inference, signals that the speaker was not present at the event. This direct/ indirect distinction closely resembles the universally attested spatial distinction between proximate and distal, a distinction that can be observed in many grammatical categories. As is well known, the proximate–distal distinction differentiates what is spatially close to the speaker to what is further away from the speaker. The distinction also often separates the visible from the invisible. This spatial distinction appears most clearly in the opposition between the English demonstratives this and here (proximate), and that and there (distal) (Diessel 2014). Proximal and distal demonstratives are used to establish a joint focus of attention between speaker and hearer (Diessel 1999).

This is of course also what evidentials do: they establish a joint focus of attention between speaker and hearer on the way in which the speaker obtained the information expressed in the statement presented to the hearer. Direct evidentiality can be viewed as proximal: it indicates that the event described in the
proposition was close to the speaker, and thus sensorily accessible (e.g. visible).\[^7\] Indirect evidentiality is distal: it indicates that the event was far away from the speaker, and sensorily inaccessible (hence often invisible). An indirect/distal evidential thus implies that the speaker indirectly obtained information about the event. So while this and that oppose proximal and distal objects, and here and there proximal and distal locations, direct and indirect evidentials can be characterized as referring to proximal and distal events. Under this view, the linguistic representation of knowledge and truth has a spatial basis. However, this spatial nature should not be viewed in terms of physical location but in terms of how events are presented as directly (proximal) or indirectly (distal) accessible to the speaker.\[^8\] This entails that markers for direct/proximal evidentiality can be derived from verbs of seeing, since what is visible to the speaker is proximal in the relevant evidential sense.

The proximate–distal distinction is also fundamental in nonlinguistic cognitive capacities such as spatial navigation (e.g. Tommasi et al. 2012). A similar distinction is present in the two core cognitive systems for geometry distinguished by Spelke et al. (2010): a system for analyzing nearby visual forms is opposed to a system for navigating larger spaces. In other words, the way in which humans present the reliability and source of their statements may reflect a deep-seated capacity shared with cognitive systems beyond language. I believe this connection needs to be further explored to better understand the relation between intra- and extralinguistic constraints on linguistic representations. This program is in line with the ‘three factors’ model for language of Chomsky (2005), who proposes that the faculty of language is composed of (a) a universal blueprint for language (Universal Grammar), (b) experience and usage, and (c) general cognitive factors. The proximal–distal distinction may well be such a general cognitive factor, and the exact nature of its interaction with language remains to be investigated.

Linguistically, this approach makes strong predictions for the way in which evidentials develop diachronically across languages, and for their interaction

\[^7\]There are many antecedents for the relation between direct/indirect evidentiality and deixis. Schlichter (1986) treats the Wintu evidential system in terms of a deictic opposition between unmarked visible events versus nonvisible events. Garrett (2001) argues that the direct evidential in Tibetan is a demonstrative assertion marker. Chung (2005) refers to ‘spatial deictic tense’ to derive direct evidentiality.

\[^8\]Note that even demonstratives do not always refer to deictic locations, as in expressions like There was this man I knew, where proximal this does not refer to a person who is locatively or contextually close to the Speaker.
with other categories: only grammatical categories that are compatible with a proximate–distal distinction can be recycled as direct–indirect evidentials. This strong ‘recycling’ hypothesis of course needs to be tested against a wide array of languages with evidential systems.

In addition to the proximal–distal dimension that translates the direct–indirect distinction in evidentiality, I would like to discuss another dimension that crosscuts the first one, and allows to describe the same four-way distinction that Speas (2010) had in mind. As mentioned before direct evidentiality can be further subdivided into situations that are only known to the speaker (something the speaker feels), and situations that are external to the speaker but directly perceived by them. Direct evidentials can be speaker-internal or speaker-external. Interestingly, Lau & Rooryck (2017) make a similar reference to the internal–external distinction in their analysis of inference and hearsay as directly related to the Aktionsart category of accomplishment. They analyze hearsay as an evidential with which the Speaker signals that the information presented in a proposition p was arrived at by a Speaker-external information update process of a source external to the speech situation informing them that p. By contrast, inferentials are minimally different from hearsay in that they refer to a Speaker-internal information update process using a variety of sources available to them. Evidentials expressing inference involve a Speaker-internal mental process of gradual ‘building up’ of the information that culminates in the Speaker possessing the relevant information expressed in p. With hearsay evidentials, the speaker is the recipient of external information, and is therefore positioned at the final stage of a process of transfer of information initiated by a third party. In both hearsay and inference, the speaker lacks direct access to the information.

The dimensions of proximal/ distal and Speaker-internal/ Speaker-external are sufficient to describe the same set of evidentials as those distinguished by Speas (2010), as shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker-internal access</th>
<th>Proximal situation</th>
<th>Distal situation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal experience</td>
<td>Inference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensory</td>
<td>Hearsay</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(8)

Note that both of these dimensions are ultimately spatial in nature. While the proximal–distal distinction is well anchored in various other grammatical categories and processes, the nature of the Speaker-internal vs Speaker-external
distinction seems much less clearly related to existing categories, and requires more investigation. In any case, I believe that this ‘spatial’ analysis of the abstract features underlying evidential categories provide a concrete set of criteria that more basic categories have to comply with in order to be eligible for their ‘recycling’ as evidentials.

8 Extending the Speaker internal/external distinction

The Speaker-internal/-external dimension may also allow for a new understanding of the relation of evidentiality with egophoricity and allophoricity (see Tournadre 1991, Hargreaves 2005, Widmer 2017 and references cited therein). Following Hargreaves (2005), Widmer (2017) views the egophoric/allophoric distinction as one that distinguishes between privileged vs non-privileged access to knowledge of a situation. On the basis of data from Tibeto-Burman languages, Widmer (2017) distinguishes egophoric markers that express ‘actional involvement’ of the speaker from egophoric markers that express ‘epistemic involvement’. Egophoric markers expressing actional involvement mark the Speaker as a participant in a situation, while egophoric markers of epistemic involvement only indicate knowledge or experience of a situation.

This distinction is very similar to the one I made above between Speaker-internal and Speaker-external access to a situation. In other words, the actional/epistemic involvement distinction within egophoricity looks like another recombination of more basic primitives of the grammar. The notion of ‘privileged access’ does not seem to involve the proximal/distal distinction. By contrast, the allophoric (non-privileged access) system does seem to interact with evidential markers: allophoric markers can also express direct and inferential evidentiality in Bunan (Widmer 2017: table 2). In terms of the system developed in (8) above, this would mean that allophoricity does make use of the proximal/distal distinction as applied to situations. Widmer’s (2017) observations about Bunan could therefore be reinterpreted along the lines of the table in (9).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Privileged access (egophoric)</th>
<th>Non-privileged access (allophoric)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>situational involvement</td>
<td>proximal situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker-internal</td>
<td>actional involvement</td>
<td>proximal situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaker-external</td>
<td>epistemic involvement</td>
<td>distal situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Inference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Once again, I hope to have shown that the relations between these various notions can be rethought in terms of different primitives: privileged access/egophoricity can be viewed as a non-spatial type of access of the Speaker to a situation.

9 Quotatives and reportatives

The table in (8) refers to hearsay as a context that involves speaker-external access to a distal situation. Throughout this paper, I have used the terms hearsay and reportative interchangeably, but I have not discussed quotatives. Note however that Table 1 puts hearsay and quotative on the same level, as part of indirect evidence. In terms of the table in (8), that cannot be quite right: quotatives are markers that attribute a sentence to a different speaker, and involve quoted speech. By contrast, reportatives only indicate that the speaker was informed about the situation described in the sentence by someone else, but the speaker uses their own words to do so. If quotatives do not fit in with reportatives, then where do they go in the table in (8)? I would like to propose that quotatives differ from reportatives in terms of the proximal-distal dimension. That is, quotatives are a special instance of speaker-external access to a situation that can be viewed as proximal in two ways. The Speaker not only indicates that they were present at a speech act by someone else, but they also present the quoted speech act in the (proximal) common ground between speaker and hearer. By contrast, using a hearsay/reportative marker would indicate that the situation described in the sentence is situated outside of the proximal space between speaker and hearer: the user of a reportative marker was neither present at the situation described, nor was there necessarily a speech act involved. This analysis places quotatives and witness markers in the same box in the table: sensory evidentials only indicate that the Speaker was present at the situation (sensory/witness), while quotatives indicate more specifically that the Speaker was present at a speech act that they reproduce in their own speech act.

The observation that quotative and reportative differ along the proximal-distal dimension can be most easily seen in direct and indirect speech in English. In (10a), direct speech can only be referred to by the proximal demonstrative
this, but not by the distal demonstrative that. By contrast, the complementizer for indirect speech in (10b) is based on the demonstrative distal that, rather than on proximal this.

(10)  a. Sue said (this/ *that): “It is raining.”
    b. Sue said (that/ *this) it is raining.

The relation between reportative and quotative is however not always defined along the proximal-distal dimension. In some languages, like Cuzco Quechua, there are markers that do double duty as quotatives and reportatives. Korotkova (2017) proposes to treat these as homophonic markers, but that seems unfortunate, as its treats the relation between reportative and quotative as entirely accidental. Under the analysis presented here, it is sufficient to say that the Quechua reportative/quotative marker –si is underspecified for the proximal-distal distinction.

10 Conclusion

Summing up, I have called into question the status of evidentiality as an autonomous grammatical category. I propose a programmatic alternative in which evidentiality arises as a result of the recombination of abstract properties of other, more basic grammatical categories. Since such recombinations often carry the ‘baggage’ of the original grammatical categories, a certain overlap and vagueness in evidential meanings is to be expected, in addition to the core set of evidential meanings expressed in Table 1.

Speas (2010) was the first to propose that evidential meanings can be reduced to more abstract primitives of the grammar, even though she still grant evidentiality the status of a separate grammatical category. I have tried to complement and constrain Speas’s (2010) analysis by a ‘spatial’ analysis of evidentiality that appeals to the dimensions of proximal/distal and Speaker-internal/Speaker external.

The ‘recycling’ perspective on evidentiality should be seen as an application of Occam’s razor: an analysis that manages to derive evidentiality with a more parsimonious set of elementary categories should be viewed as superior to an analysis that needlessly adds taxonomic distinctions.

More broadly, a ‘recycling’ perspective on evidentiality could provide us with information on the limits and organization of the functional domain, a program
akin to that of Wiltschko (2014). If evidentiality recycles independently motivated, more basic categories of human language, such a result would illuminate our understanding of the elementary categories of language as grammatical tools for representing the origin and reliability of our statements. Such a program would allow us to distinguish the elementary categories of grammar from categories that are derived from these. Moreover, it would illustrate the surprisingly versatile uses to which these elementary categories can be put. This approach would afford a new window into the way in which the language faculty accommodates the diversity of the world’s languages in terms of a limited set of abstract elementary categories that can be put to a variety of uses.

References


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